Last year the Islamic State terrorist group has faced a series of violent attacks and offensives from both US-led coalition and Syria-Russia-Iran axis as well as predominantly Kurdish SDF and Turkish army\FSA proxies. Suffering from heavy bombardment, artillery, drone, missile strikes all over the “caliphate’s” territory, total economic blockade and finally massive ground offensives all the year, ISIS experienced a number of important setbacks but has eventually survived in 2016 unlike many experts’ predictions.
First of all during long and tough countryside warfare with Iraqi security forces, mainly newly-formed and US-trained and supplied “Golden division”, the terrorist group has lost control of the so-called “sunni triangle” north-west of Baghdad – the provincial capital of Anbar – Ar-Ramadi, the region of Hit and the notorious city of Al-Fallujah. This loss makes it totally impossible for IS to conduct large military operations and raids on and near Baghdad also finally dispelling the group’s plans of general battle for the ancient Middle East city in order to make it “caliphate’s” capital like it was in Abbasids era.
Secondly, due to large Turkey military operation in northern Syria – the “Euphrates shield”, IS was driven out of the important region in north-eastern Aleppo province also known as Azaz-Jarablus-Al-Bab triangle. The retreat from Jarablus and eventually Al-Bab marked the end of group’s presence along the Syrian-Turkish border which means not only the end of any previous Erdogan-IS cooperation but also a full cut of the “Islamic State” ties with various “humanitarian” Saudi and Qatar funds located in Turkey.
The same time mainly because of new US president Donald Trump’s anti-IS strategy which has removed all restrictions of US supplying SDF units, the former were able to make large gains in northern Syria, strongly isolating the IS self-proclaimed capital of Ar-Raqqa and nearly connecting with their fellow men in Afrin canton.
The group’s held large areas in vast Syrian desert were also vulnerable for Damascus attacks despite the fact that no major gains were made by government forces. Now the Syrian desert or eastern Homs warfare as mostly concentrated round the ancient city of Tadmor (Palmyra), lately recaptured by SAA and Russia once again.
Furthermore SAA’s 3d armoured division alongside 4th division’s special operations branch and some units of ruling Baath party have made attempts to widen a buffer zone with IS near Christian town of Al-Qaratayn and Saiqal military airbase in eastern Damascus. These movements put the local IS units in danger of being expelled from the Damascus province and even isolated from their bases in east Homs if strategic Barida crossroad is captured.
However all aforementioned setbacks still don’t let us say that the group is on verge of collapsing.
Despite the fact that war on IS is widely covered by many MSM, non-government and analysis organizations, independent experts and journalists, we can’t be sure of real group’s casualties numbers since IS has shown solid skills in camouflaging convoys and bases, hardly fortifying real ones and even producing fake targets like wooden vehicles, tanks and car bombs. Also we should consider that withdrawal from Al-Bab or Ramadi, for instance, may be not a sign of heavy losses in the group’s ranks, but a tactical or strategic move to save fighting capabilities for coming operations while there is no chances to overcome strong resistance, fire and bombardment of their rivals in big cities and towns. The idea may be sustained with the fact that IS leaders have been making their decisions mostly on the assumption of biggest profits and real state of things in each case since the “Islamic State” was established.
So we may suggest that IS still can form and send quite massive reinforcements in any area of escalated fighting.
On the other hand almost all IS losses in 2016 are heavy populated areas and big military installations like Al-Qayarah military airbase, Mosul airport and its surroundings. Losing these sites means losing important strongholds to operate at the frontline and enemy’s rear offensively as well as losing huge weapon\ammunition depots and training camps. Thus the group is likely to turn their attention to consolidating previous gains and building large defense lines in last vital places – Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zour, Al-Bukamal and Al-Qaim in 2017. In other words the thing we may be sure in is that the spread of the “caliphate” throughout Syria and Iraq is finally over.
The same time during 2016’s battles with Iraqi\Syrian governments, Turkey, FSA mercenaries, and Al-Nusra Front (currently named as “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham”) IS clearly demonstrated that fighting it all mentioned powers are fighting a state, not just rich and large terrorist group.
IS is the only Middle East jihadist force (except partly recognized Hezbollah) to set up massive production and effective usage of armed drones and SVBIEDs – suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices or car bombs. Some other hardline islamists (e.g. Al-Nusra front, Ahrar al-Sham, Jund al-Aqsa) has also used it around Syrian cities of Aleppo and Daraa and in Hama northern countryside, but all them didn’t manage to produce such vehicles on an industrial scale, use people of any nationality to drive it and use it day by day to crush enemy’s frontline. The usage and production of armed drones which has actively started around three months ago also shows an industrial approach and seems to be elaborated as a doctrine, not just for some concrete cases.
Dawawins or state institutions of IS – Dawawin al-Jund (“defense ministry), Dawawin at-Taalim (“educational ministry”), Dawawin Fay val Ganaim (“spoils of war ministry”), Dawawin al-Amni al-Umm (“internal ministry”) and others, are likely not just handsome titles but working structures producing weapon, food, electricity, soldiers, engineers, experienced field commanders and “living bombs”. The latters should be considered vivid examples of IS techniques to work with the area’s population and use it “on its full capacity” as not only hundreds of middle-aged men are launching such attack on daily basis in every part of the “caliphate”, but also foreigners, elderly people and even kids from 12 to 17 years old. Furthermore, we may suggest that a very solid part of that people isn’t hardly made launch these suicide missions as there were no serious uprisings or protests clearly recorded across the ISIS lands in Syria and Iraq. Thus some kinds of mental pressure should be used to cause at least dozens persons of ripe years and their children monthly blow themselves up among SF gatherings. Also it’s important to note many of aforementioned bombers haven’t previously fought alongside IS militants but lived as civilians.
Source: Al Masdar News
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